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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES,
Chartered, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18232

THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Respondent's Brief misstated or distorted the
facts in several important particulars, it is necessary for
Mountain Bell to respond thereto as follows:
1.

While Respondents claim that the only listing error

occurred in the yellow page listing for the Allen firm, the
fact is that another error was made in the white page listing
for the Allen firm, wherein the residence addresses and
telephone numbers for the firm members preceded the firm's
address and number, contrary t_o the listing order in prior
and subsequent issues of the directory (Ex. 1, p. 94; Tr. 201).
Thus, for example, a person seeking the services of Michael
Hughes, a member of the Allen firm, might be directed by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

white pages to call his residence, and by the yellow pages
to call the Atkin firm's number.
2.

The Telalease, which Respondent claims is a contract

for a specific telephone number, nowhere contains a provision
that specifically grants Respondent a right

~o

the number.

A telephone number was inserted merely for identification
purposes, together with the firm's name and address, but
there was no provision stating that that number was a term
of the Telalease.

By its terms, the Telalease is simply an

equipment lease (Ex. 6, • 1).

It specifically incorporates

all applicable tariffs, is fully integrated, and provides
that Mountain Bell is not bound by any representations not
set forth therein (Ex. 6, ! 8).
3.

The initial decision to place an intercept on the

Atkin firm-' s line was neither arbitrary nor without prior
notice.

(Tr. 208.)

Mountain Bell's General Attorney, Kenneth

Madsen, met with representatives of both the Allen firm and
the Atkin firm to discuss the problem prior to implementing
the intercept, and various alternatives were considered.
(Tr. 179-80, 182, 189, 193-94, 199-200, 630-34.)

The intercept

procedure was chosen in order to direct callers to the law
firm they wished to reach, and was the most reasonable
approach available under the circumstances.
4.

(Tr. 630-34.)

The Amended Complaint (R. 81-92) claimed damages

resulting only from the mechanical intercept, which was in
effect for only thirty-six hours (Tr. 538-39.)

Respondent
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did not amend its Complaint after the live intercept was
implemented to allege damages resulting therefrom.

Nevertheless,

Respondent was permitted, over objection, to introduce
evidence supporting damages that allegedly arose as a result
of deficiencies in the operation of the live intercept,
which was placed some four months after. the mechanical
intercept was removed.

Respondent did not move to amend its

Complaint to conform to the evidence, nor did the Court make
any such order sua sponte.
5.

Though Mountain Bell supported an intercept procedure

generally, it never endorsed the live operator intercept
procedure before_ the Public Service Commission; rather,
Respondent insisted on a live operator intercept if the
Commission determined that an intercept should be placed,
notwithstanding Mountain Bell's warnings concerning the
difficulty of operating a live intercept with consistency
and accuracy.
6.

(Tr. 421-24.)

No witness for the Atkin firm stated that he sought

advice or legal services from another attorney as a result
of the difficulties with the live operator intercept.

Nor

did any witness testify that he or she lost faith in the
Atkin firm because of the difficulties or blamed the Atkin
firm therefor.
7.

With regard to the Atkin firm's special damages for

reprinting stationery, etc., the evidence was that Mountain
Bell had offered to pay for such expenses.

(Tr. 192, 662-63.)
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In any event, however, the jury did not award any amount as
and for special damages.
8.

(Tr. 782.)

The evidence shows no reduction in the Atkin firm's

annual revenue during the period the directory with the
erroneous listing was in effect.

(Tr. 525-29, Ex. 27.)

The

bulk of evidence of damage was with respect to projected
income.

522~

(Tr.

529-36.)

ARGUMENT
The Atkin firm argues passionately that the jury verdict
should be affirmed because there was substantial evidence to
support it.
evidence.

Mountain Bell disputes that there was such
The important point, however, is that no verdict

can be sustained where the trial court has committed prejudicial
errors of law.
In the present case, the errors of law were numerous,
and include:

the trial court's failure to rule that Mountain

Bell cannot be held liable for actions taken consistent with
a filed tariff (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-16); its failure
to hold that Mountain Bell cannot be held liable for following
a specific order of the Public Service Commission (see Appellant's
Brief, pp. 16-22); its failure to limit Mountain Bell's
liability as a matter of law as a result of applicable
tariffs (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-36); its jury instructions
that a contract existed for a specific telephone number (see
Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-25); its failure to include Mountain
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Bell's theories of defense adequately in the jury instructions
(see Appellant's Brief, pp. 25-30); and its failure to rule
or instruct the jury that the placement of the intercept was
reasonable, just, fair and equitable, and that the court and
jury were bound by the findings of the Public Service
Connnission (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 30-33).

POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, MOUNTAIN BELL'S ACTIONS
WERE REASONABLE, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND
LAWFUL; HENCE THERE IS NO BASIS FOR LIABILITY.
A. The Public Service Corrnnission Order and Findings
establish conclusivel that Mountain Bell's actions were fair,
reasona
t e pu ic interest.
In its Brief, Respondent has totally ignored perhaps
the most critical fact in this case--that the Public Service
Connnission (PSC) found, not just as a general proposition,
but with respect to the specific facts of this case:

(1)

that tariff Section 20(N)(l) was valid and applicable and
precluded Respondent from asserting any.property right to
any specific telephone number; and (2) that the intercept
and number change procedure, which formed the sole basis for
Respondent's Complaint, was llfair", "equitable", "reasonable",
and "just".

(R. 129-130A.)

The PSC order based on those

findings was confirmed by this Court when it dissolved the
preliminary injunction.
The PSC order resulted from a hearing in which Respondent
participated fully, the Commission holding that Respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had made a general appearance by virtue of its participation.

(Ex. 24 at 95-98.)

The findings and order were not

appealed and became final; hence, they could not be attacked
collaterally.

Utah Code Ann.

§

54-7-14.

Nevertheless, the

trial court's jury instructions ignored these facts and
erroneously permitted the jury to assess damages on findings
that were in direct conflict with the PSC order.
Thus, the cases cited by Respondent are distinguishable
from the present case.

In Muskegon Agency, Inc. v. General

Telephone Co., 340 Mich. 472, 65 N.W.2d 748 (1954) and 350
Mich. 41, 85 N.W.2d 170 (1957), for example, a telephone
company was held liable, not.because it had placed an intercept,
but because it had changed plaintiff's telephone number and
refused to place an intercept, and further prevented all
calls from reaching the plaintiff over the printed telephone
number.

Furthermore, the Michigan court there held that the

case did not involve an error in listings; rather, the error
was in negligently assigning plaintiff a number that had
a~ready

been assigned to another party; no tariff limitation

of liability for that kind of action existed at that time.
Id. at 750-52.

See also Valentine v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,

388 Mich. 19, 199 N.W.2d 182, 184 (1972).

In any event,

Muskegon is "contrary to the great weight of authority".
Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 S.W.2d 596,
602 (Mo. App. 1968), cited with approval by the Michigan
court in Valentine, supra, 199 N.W.2d at 184, n.l.
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Similarly, in Clayton Home Equipment Co. v. Florida
Telephone Corp., 152 So.2d 203 (Fla. App. 1963), the court
held that an allegation that the telephone company had
"arbitrarily and without just cause" withdrawn plaintiff's
telephone number was sufficient to state a claim.

In addition,

the Court there made no mention of an applicable tariff
limitation of liability.
Product Research Associates v. Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 654, 94 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971),
cited by Respondent, is distinguishable on its facts, but
more importantly, it has been

~xpressly

overruled in Waters v.

Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1974) (see 523 P.2d at 1167, n.10).
In the present case, the finding by the Public Service
Commission that Mountain Bell's action in changing the Atkin
firm's number was reasonable and just under the circumstances
precludes a contrary conclusion.

B. The court erred in instructin the jury that it could
find a contract or a telephone number.
The intercept procedure was proper because, as the
Public Service Commission found, the Atkin firm had no
property right in the telephone number and under the circumstances,
Mountain Bell had just cause to change it.

That finding

disposes of Respondent's argument that it had a right to the
number based on negotiations with Mountain Bell's employee,
Dennis Wood, and based on the Telalease.

Wood did not have
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the power to enter a contract on behalf of Mountain Bell
that was contrary to the tariff.

See Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7

("[N]o public utility shall ... extend to any person any form
of contract or agreement ... except such as are regularly and
uniformly extended to all corporations and persons").
also Utah Code Ann.

§

See

54-3-8 (prohibiting preferences).

With respect to the argument that the Telalease constituted
a contract for a particular number, it is sufficient to note
that the Telalease is an equipment lease only and that it
contains no provision granting the lessee the right to a
specific telephone number.

Furthermore, the Telalease is

fully integrated and specifically incorporates all applicable
tariff provisions (including, therefore, Tariff Section 20(N)(l)
denying a right to a particular telephone number).

(See Ex.

6, , 8.)

Respondent's reliance on Tariff Section 20(B) and the
Private Line Tariff to establish a ''contract for a telephone
number" is misplaced.

Those tariffs refer only to a contract

between Mountain Bell and its.-subscriber for telephone
service, not a telephone number.

If, as Respondent insists,

the relationship between the Telephone Company and its
subscribers is characterized as contractual, then the terms
of the contract are the tariff provisions, including Section
20(N)(l), which denies the subscriber a right to any particular
~umber.

See Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1,

523 P.2d 1161, 1162, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974).
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C.
In

Mountain Bell did not violate Tariff Section 20(E)(4).
~espouse

to Mountain Bell's argument that its liability

is limited by Tariff Section 20(E)(3), Respondent argues
that Mountain Bell violated Tariff Section 20(E)(4) by
inserting itself into a controversy between customers.
argument is patently absurd.

That

In the first place, that

section of the tariff typically applies where a business
splits up and more than one faction asserts the right to retain
use of a published telephone number, which was not the case
here.

More importantly, this action was not a controversy

between customers; rather, it was a con.troversy between the
Allen firm (whose number had been incorrectly printed and
which vehemently protested to Mountain Bell and threatened
suit against Mountain Bell), and Mountain Bell (which had
committed the error).

The Atkin firm was necessarily drawn

into the controversy because its number was the one printed
for the Allen firm.

The resolution of the problem necessarily

required action by Mountain Bell; hence, it could not avoid
being a party to the controversy.
In summary, the findings of the Public Service Commission
that the Atkin firm had no property right in the telephone
number and that Mountain Bell was justified in putting into
operation the intercept and number change procedure established
that Mountain Bell's actions were reasonable and lawful;
therefore, as a matter of law Mountain Bell is not liable
for such actions.
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POINT II
TARIFF LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY LIMIT
MOUNTAIN BELL'S LIABILITY FOR ALLEGED
DEFICIENCIES IN PROVISION OF TELEPHONE
SERVICE, INCLUDING THE OPERATION OF THE
INTERCEPTS.
A. Mountain Bell's liability for directory errors and
service interruptions or malfunctions is limited by tariff.
Respondent's argument that the Public Service Commission
does not have jurisdiction over the furnishing of paid
advertising in the yellow pages, while correct, misses the
point on several scores.

First, the error in the yellow

pages (the listing of Atkin's number for the Allen firm) was
an error in the initial yellow page listing of the Allen
firm, which, under the categorization of 74 Am. Jur. 2d
Telecommunications

§

32, is a "type l" error, over which the

Commission does have jurisdiction, under the authority of
Allen v. General Telephone Co., 20 Wash. App. 144, 578 P.2d
1333 (1978), and other cases cited in Appellant's Brief
(pp. 34-36).

The fact that the error was printed in bold type

is of no consequence because the Atkin firm's number should
not have been printed at all in the Allen firm's initial listing.
Therefore, the tariff limitation of liability (Section
20(E)(3)) applies.

See Allen, supra, which applied a similar

tariff limitation where the plaintiff's initial yellow page
listi~g

was omitted, even though plaintiff had contracted

for that listing to be in bold print.
Respondent acknowledges that such a limitation would
apply to the Allen firm (see Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-23),
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but in a classic example of a double standard, asserts that
the limitation should not apply to it.

However, the language

of the limitation does not limit Mountain Bell's liability
only as to those customers in whose listings an error appears.
It states:
The Telephone Company's liability arising from
errors in or omissions of directory listings shall
be limited to and satisfied by a refund not exceeding
the amount of the charges for such of the customer's
service as is a_ffected during the period covered by
the directory ih which the error or omission occurs.
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company General
Exchange Tariff§ 20(E)(3).
Thus the limitation applies to any customer whose
service is affected by a listing error.
There is a second respect iri which Respondent's argument
that the Commission ha.s no jurisdiction over yellow page
advertising misses the point.

Respondent's action for

damages does not arise directly out of the error in the
Allen firm's listing; rather, it arises out of the change in
its telephone service which was implemented to correct the
listing error.

More specifically, the bulk of Respondent's

claimed damage allegedly arose out of deficiencies in the
operation of the intercepts.
It may be argued that even the alleged deficiencies
with the Respondent's service arose out of the listing
error, since it was.the listing error that necessitated the
intercepts.

A similar situation was presented in Warner v.

Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1968).
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In that case, plaintiff's listing appeared in the wrong
geographical section of the directory for two consecutive
years.

As a result, operators told long distance callers

trying to obtain plaintiff's number from the directory
assistance service trat no such business was listed in the
town where plaintiff was located.

Plaintiff argued that the

tariff limitation of liability relating to directory errors
was inapplicable because the "mislisting" was not merely in
the directories but was continued at the toll centers for
the long distance and information operators.

Notwithstanding

the fact that plaintiff's claimed damages arose from failure
of the operators to give correct information to callers, the
court applied the tariff limitation of liability relating to
directory errors, stating that the "whole difficulty arose
out of the errors in the directories".

Id. at 600.

See

also Garrison v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 45
Ore. App. 523, 608 P.2d 1206, 1211 (1980), in which the
court observed:
Rates, service.levels, and the remedy for erroneous
listings or service failures are inseparable.
The provision of telephone service is undoubtedly
within the Public Service Connnission's jurisdiction, and
Respondent does not suggest otherwise.

Telephone service is

provided pursuant and subject to the tariffs filed with the
Public Service Commission.

One ,such tariff which specifically

limits Mountain Bell's liability for errors in the furnishing
of telephone service is Section 20(G)(5), which provides:
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Apart from the credit allowance stated above, [which
simply gives the customer proportionate credit against
local service charges for the period of time the service
is not functioning, provided notice has been given to
the Telephone Company] , no liability shall attach to
the Telephone Company for damages arising from errors,
mistakes, omissions, interruptions, or delays of the
Telephone Company, its agents, servants, or employees,
in the course of establishing, furnishing, rearranging,
moving, terminating, or changing the service or
facilities (including the obtaining or furnishing of
information in respect thereof or with respect to
subscribers or users of the service or facilities),
in the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Such a tariff is valid and applies to limit Mountain Bell's
liability for the alleged deficiencies in operation of the
intercepts.

See,

~'

Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co.,_ 12 Cal.

3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974), and other cases
cited in Appellant '.s Brief, pp. 34-35.
The policy behind such limitations of liability is
aptly expressed in Cole v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 246 P.2d 686, 688 (1952):
The theory underlying these decisions is that a public
utility, being strictly regulated in all operations
with considerable curtailment of its rights and
privileges shall likewise be regulated and limited
as to its liabilities. In consideration of its being
peculiarly the subject of state control, 'its liability
is and should be defined and limited' . . . There is
nothing harsh or inequitable in upholding such a limitation
of liability when it is thus considered that the rates as
fixed by the Commission are established with the rule of
limitation in mind. Reasonable rates are in part dependent
upon such a rule.
(Citations omitted.)
The very existence of such a tariff provision is an
acknowledgement that the telephone company cannot guarantee
that its service will always operate perfectly.

See

Hamilton Employment Service v. New York Telephone Co.,
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253 N.Y. 468, 171 N.E. 710 (1930).

When Respondent did not

receive perfect service, therefore, it became subject to the
limitation of liability which was designed for just such an
occurrence.

B. Mountain Bell's actions did not constitute gross
negligence or willful misconduct.
Respondent seeks to avoid the application of the tariff
limitation of liability by arguing that the exception relating
to "gross negligence or willful misconduct" applies in this
case.

The Public Service Commission's findings that the

number chan&e and intercept procedure were "fair" and "reasonable"
are sufficient response to Respondent's argument.

Further,

the circumstances of the case support the reasonableness of
Mountain Bell's actions.

Mountain Bell did not derive, nor

could it expect to derive, any special benefit from placing
an intercept on Respondent's line.

On the contrary, Mountain

Bell was put to considerable trouble and expense to place
the intercept.

The only reason it did so was to serve the

public interest, so that members of the public who called
the number listed for both the Allen firm and the Atkin firm
could be directed to the appropriate firm.

There was no

other realistic solution to the problem created by the
listing error.

Furthermore, not to have placed the intercept

might have led to claims by the Allen firm of discrimination,
inadequate service, gross negligence and willful misconduct,
to say nothing of th.e possibility of a contempt citation by
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the Public Service Commission.

Mountain Bell followed the

law which requires a public utility to follow orders, rules
and regulations of the Public Service Commission.
Ann.

§

54-3-23.

Utah Code

For these reasons, it was error for the

trial court to instruct the jury that it could find that
Mountain Bell was guilty of gross negligence or willful
misconduct (which the trial court erroneously equated;
see Instruction 5-G, R. 320).
The cases cited by Respondent on the issue of tariff
limitation of liability for service problems are instructive
and support Mountain Bell's position.

In Pilot Industries v.

Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 495 F. Supp. 356
(D.S.C. 1979), plaintiff sued the telephone company for
damages, consisting of lost business, allegedly resulting
from interruptions in telephone service as well as errors in
directory listings.

The evidence was that despite numerous

complaints to the telephone company, plaintiff had experienced
trouble with its lines affecting incoming WATS calls for a
period of 41 days.

Southern Bell asserted that a tariff,

very similar to ·section 20(G)(5), limited its liability.
Applying the tariff, the court held that under the facts of
that case, there was no evidence of gross negligence or willful
misconduct sufficient to avoid the tariff limitation.
The Court in Pilot Industries quoted from Rogers v.
Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E. 2d 258 (1958)
regarding the proper test for determining whether an act can
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be characterized as reckless, willful, or wanton, stating
that the determination is made by ascertaining whether the
act complained of
has been committed in such a manner or under such
circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or
prudence would then have been conscious of it as
an invasion of the plaintiff's rights . . . It is
this resent consciousness of wron doin that
justi ies the assessment o punitive damages . . . ;
and it has been variously referred to as 'conscious
failure to observe due care;' . . . 'conscious
indifference to the rights of others,' . . . and
as 'gross disregard of the rights of the person
injured' . . . But the common denominator of these
expressisns is the test before mentioned, viz:
that at the time of his act or omission to act
the tort feasor be conscious, or chargeable with
consciousness, of his wrongdoing.
Id. at 263-264.

(Emphasis added by the court.)

Under that test, Mountain Bell would clearly not be guilty
of gross negligence or willful misconduct in this case,
since the record is clear that Mountain Bell believed its
acts to be lawful and within the powers granted to it under
the tariffs.

The Public Service Commission confirmed that

belief by its findings.
The Cou·rt in Pilot Industries further quoted from
Holman v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 358 F. Supp. 727
(D. Kan. 1973), which granted summary judgment for the
telephone company on the basis of a tariff limitation of
liability, holding as a matter of law that the following
acts and omissions did not constitute willful or wanton
conduct sufficient to come within the exception to the
tariff limitation of liability:
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A. The plaintiffs' telephone number did not ring when
persons dialed the plaintiffs' telephone number.
B. Persons dialing the plaintiffs' telephone number
received a busy signal when in fact none of the
plaintiffs' telephones were in use.
C. Persons calling the plaintiffs' telephone could
hear the answering party faintly, however, the parties
were not able to communicate.
D. The plaintiffs' equipment did not work in conjunction
with the main body of telephone equipment and did not
function as normal telephone equipment functions.
E. Other telephone calls were superimposed upon those
of the plaintiffs.

F.

A mechanical intercept would erroneously advise
callin
laintiffs' telephone numbers that the
ers were no anger in service.

G. Defendant failed to properly maintain the equipment
connecting plaintiffs' telephones with the- central
offices out of which plaintiffs' telephones were
maintained, and defendant faiied to maintain properly
the telephone equipment installed by the defendant
upon plaintiffs' premises . . . .

H. Defendant failed to furnish a sufficient number of
sufficiently-trained personnel to repair the equipment
when it malfunctioned, both at plaintiffs' premises
and in the central offices noted.
Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
In Wilkinson v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
327 Mass. 132, 97 N.E.Zd 413 (1951), also quoted in Pilot
Industries, supra, the court reached a similar conclusion
where plaintiff complained numerous times about faulty
service over a period of about five months.
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Rucker, 537
S.W.2d 326, 332-33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), a similar case,
the court stated:
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While the record is replete with instances
when the station could not broadcast because of
problems with telephone company lines, or interference
with lines between.the station and transmitter, we
find no evidence that the error in reconnecting
the remote control lines at the transmitter resulted
from an entire want of care which would raise the
belief that the acts or omissions were the result of
a conscioui indifference to the rights or welfare of
the persons to be affected by them. This has long been
the requirement in a gross negligence case.
The court in Rucker refused to apply the exception to the
tariff limitation of liability under the circumstances of
that case.
Closer to home, in Olson v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 119 Ariz. 321, 580 P.2d 782 (1978), the
plaintiff complained of loss of business from a failure to
place an intercept, alleging a series of acts which plaintiff
claimed fell within a "willful and deliberate" exception to
the tariff limitation of liability.

The evidence was that

many customers had difficulty in reaching plaintiff and some
did not reach her at all (similar to the allegations of the
Atkin firm in the present case).

Rejecting the argument

that Mountain Bell's acts, taken together, constituted
willful conduct, the court granted.Mountain Bell summary
judgment, stating:
A plaintiff cannot establish intentional and
deliberate conduct within the tariff's exception to
the limitation on liability merely by showing a
series of negligent acts.
Id. at 784.
Finally, in Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App. 1968), the court held as a matter
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of law that the evidence was not sufficient to establish
willful, wanton or reckless conduct under facts significantly
more egregious than in the present case (see discussion,
supra, pp. 11-12).
Considering the case

l~w

cited, together with the

Public Service Commission finding that Mountain Bell's
number change and intercept procedure was fair and reasonable,
this Court should hold as a matter of law that Mountain
Bell's conduct did not constitute gross negligence or willful
misconduct.

Hence, the tariff limitations of liability

apply and the damage award must be reversed.

POINT III
THE DAMAGE VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
A.

There was no substantial evidence of lost business.

Respondent did not plead special damage with specificity,
as required by Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor
was the issue of special damages submitted to the jury.
The verdict specifically states that "general damages" were
being awarded.

(R. 336.)

The question, therefore, is

whether an award ·of general damage is supported by the
evidence.

Mountain Bell contends it is not because Respondent

failed to produce any evidence of actual loss of business
proximately caused by the alleged problems with telephone
service.
The only evidence of lost business Respondent could
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point to in support of the verdict is that some clients had
difficulty in telephoning Respondent.

One witness, Richard

Hunter, testified that a problem he wished to consult with a
member of the firm about resolved itself before he could
reacb Mr. Miles (Tr. 292).

Such evidence is clearly not

substantial enough to support a verdict for $25,000.00.

The

fact is that there was absolutely no evidence that any
client of Respondent took any legal business to another
lawyer as a result of difficulties with the telephone
service.
The testimony and exhibit introduced by John Miles on
the issue of damages was highly speculative in that it dealt
primarily with projected income, rather than with actual
income.

The evidence on actual income showed that the

firm's annual income for 1980 increased over 1979 and the
income for 1981 increased over 1980.

Regardless of the

income figures, however, there is a glaring lack of evidence
of a causal connection between the operation of the intercepts
and the supposed drop in projected income.
Plaintiff's evidence of damage thus falls short of the
standard required by the law.

In Wade v. Southwestern Bell

Telephone Co., 352 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), the
court held that plaintiff, an attorney, had not met his
burden in proving loss of business "to a reasonable degree
of certainty" in a directory omission case.

The court

described plaintiff's burden thusly:
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The burden was upon appellant to allege and
prove the loss of profits and that such loss resulted
from the alleged breach of contract by appellee and
that such loss of profits must be established with
a reasonable degree of certainty and cannot be left
to speculation.
Id. at 462.
The court also set forth the following test for proving
damages for loss of business:
First, plaintiff must prove that he actually
did lose some business as a result of the alleged
breach of contract.
Second, plaintiff must show that this loss of
business resulted in a loss in his net profits for
it is only loss of profits for which the law allows
recovery.
Third, plaintiff must establish this loss of net
profits with a reasonable degree of certainty for
recovery may not be had where proof of lost profits
is uncertain or speculative, especially where the
claim is based upon alleged breach of an advertising
contract.
Id.
Accord Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956).

In Wade, which presented a more

plausible case for damages than the instant case (because
plaintiff's listing was completely omitted), the court noted
that, as in the present case, there was no proof of loss of
any particular piece of business; hence, plaintiff's claim
for loss was "wholly speculative" and the directed verdict
was affirmed.
In Mitchell v ..Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 298
S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1957), plaintiff sued the telephone
company for loss of business allegedly arising out of an
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incorrect number listing.

Plaintiff's witnesses testified,

among other things, of a drastic reduction in the number of
calls received during the period the directory with the
erroneous number was in effect.

Although the evidence was

the best available, the court held that it was still speculative
since, as in this case, the company earnings were greater
than the year before and the claimed loss was reached by
"estimate upon estimate, which left the whole matter in the
realm of conjecture or speculation."

Id. at 523.

In Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d
18, 504 P.2d 40 (1972), this court held that although the
defendant lost a major customer because of plaintiff's
wrongful eviction (the customer being unable to contact
defendant), the judgment for substantial general damages
consisting of projected lost profits was speculative and
could not stand, stating that in such circumstances, only
nominal damages could be awarded.

Applying the rationale of

Monter to the present case, this Court should hold a fortiori
(because Respondent showed no loss of clients) that Respondent
is entitled to judgment for nominal damages at most.

Accord

Page v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 418 N.E.2d
1217 (Mass. 1981); Gould v. Mountain States Telephone

& Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d 187, 309 P.2d 802, 803 (1957).
The other cases cited by Respondent on the issue of
damages are distinguishable.

In Southwestern Bell Telephone

Co. v. Reeves, 578 S.W.2d 795 .(Tex. Civ. App. 1979), the
judgment for an attorney for lost business resulting from a
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failure to intercept calls was sustained upon proof that a
major client of the attorney obtained legal services elsewhere
and paid other lawyers substantial amounts because he could
not contact the plaintiff.

Cf. Gould v. Mountain States

Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra; Mountain States TeJephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Hinchcliffe, 204 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1953).
There is no such evidence in the present case.
In B & W Rustproofing, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,
88 Mich. App. 242, 276 N.W.2d 572 (1979), cited by Respondent,
the question of sufficiency of evidence of damage was neither
raised nor discussed.
In Sommerville v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.,
258 F. 147 (D.C. Cir. 1919), cited by Respondent, a judgment
for $.11 was reversed, but the court never dealt with the
question of the proper measure of damages for lost business,
nor with the proper standard of proof thereof.
In summary, under the authority cited, the evidence in
this case should be held to be too speculative to support an
award of compensatory damage, where there is no evidence of
actual loss of business, and the claimed loss of business is
based on unsupported projections and estimates.

B.

The failure to show loss of net income precludes recovery.

The law requires proof of net loss to support an award
for loss of business; proof of gross loss only is insufficient.
~Garcia

v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

315 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1963); Dowling Supply & Equipment,
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Inc. v. City of Anchorage, 490 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1971);
Augustine v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
91 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1956); Cagle v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 143 Ga. App. 603, 239 S.E.2d 182 (1977);
Joy Floral Co. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 563 S.W.2d
190 (Tenn. App. 1977); Wade v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
352 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
Respondent seeks to avoid the effect of this rule by
claiming that its expenses were "fixed" and thus were unrelated
to gross income.

The fact is, however, that no such evidence

appears in the record.

Respondent's statements, therefore,

are an attempt to remedy a fatal deficiency in the evidence,
and this Court should not countenance such tactics.
Respondent erroneously cites Security Development Co. v.
Fedco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 700 (1969), for the
proposition that evidence of a decline in gross receipts is
sufficient to sustain a verdict.

In that case (as shown by

the quotation in Respondent's Brief), there was evidence
that net profits were directly related to gross profits.
such evidence exists in the present case.

No

If, as Respondent

argues, its expenses were fixed, it would have been a simple
matter to produce evidence of that fact; the failure to do
so indicates that the "best evidence reasonably obtainable"
was not presented.

Cf. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph

Co. v. Hinchcliffe, 204 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1953).

Hence,

this Court should reverse the damage award.
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Respondent's contention that Mountain Bell waived its
right to require evidence of loss of net profits by stipulating
that Respondent's income tax returns not be introduced into
evidence is plainly wrong.

A simple stipulation that Mountain

Bell will not offer Respondent's tax returns falls far short
of an agreement which alters the measure of damages and
relieves Respondent of its burden of proof.

If Respondent

had offered the returns, it might have provided a basis for
establishing the relationship between gross income and net
income.

But it was Respondent which sought their exclusion;

therefore, Respondent cannot now be heard to complain of it.
In summary, the legal authority before the Court in
this case establishes that to recover for loss of business a
plaintiff must show an actual loss of business resulting in
a loss of net profits and that such loss was proximately
caused by the wrongful act of the defendant.

In this case,

Respondent has failed to show any of those elements; hence,
the damage award must be reversed.

POINT IV
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES.
Respondent does not seriously contend that Mountain
Bell acted with malice; rather, it argues that mere "willfulness",
in the sense of intentionally committing an act, is sufficient
for punitive damages.

That is not the law in Utah or in

other jurisdictions, as the following will demonstrate.
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Respondent predicates, its punitive damage claim on Utah
Code Ann.

§_

54-7-22.

That reliance is misplaced.

Applicable

case law establishes that that statute does not create a
general cause of action for service problems.

A cause of

action under that statute arises only where a public utility
fails to perform a specific act required by statute or
Commission order.

If Mountain Bell had willfully failed to

comply with the Public Service Commission order which required
it to place a live intercept, a claim under Section 54-7-22
might have arisen.
order.

But Mountain Bell complied with the

Hence, that section is inapplicable.

Furthermore, Respondent cannot assert a claim under
Section 54-7-22 which would defeat the application of the
tariff limitation of liability.

In Waters v. Pacific Telephone,

12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974), the
California Supreme Court squarely faced the same issue
presented in this case.

The plaintiff there sued to recover

damages allegedly resulting from defendant's failure to
provide adequate telephone service.

Plaintiff contended

that the action was permitted by Section 2106 of the California
Public Utilities Code, which is virtually identical to
Utah's Section 54-7-22.

The court was faced with the potential

conflict between Section 2106 and another provision of the
Code, Section 1759, which divested lower courts of jurisdiction
to "review, revise, correct or annul" any order of the
Public Utilities Commission (Section 1759 is virtually
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identical to Utah's Section 54-7-16).

Affirming the trial

court's dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the
tariff limitation of liability, the court stated:
Since an award of substantial damages to
plaintiff would be contrary to the policy adopted
by the Commission and would interfere with the
Commission's regulation of telephone utilities,
we have concluded that Section 1759 bars the
instant action.
523 P.2d at 1162.
See also Shoemaker v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
559 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1976); Burke v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 348 Ill. App. 529, 109 N.E. 2d 358 (1952); State ex rel.
Mount~in

States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. District Court,

503 P.2d 526 (Mont. 1972), Driscoll v. New York Telephone Co.,
70 Misc. 2d 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d 97

(1972); Leighton v. New York

Telephone Co., 61 N.Y.S. 2d 112 (1946).
Under the holding and rationale of Waters and the other
cases cited, Respondent's claim for damage for inadequate
service under Section 54-7-22 would be barred.

Hence,

Respondent cannot assert that statute as a basis for recovery
of punitive damages, and Instruction 5-0, which essentially
quoted Section 54-7-22, was given in error.

(R. 327.)

Respondent's reliance on Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-1 and
54-3-8 as a basis for a cause of action for inadequate
service is also misplaced.

In Abraham v. New York Telephone Co.,

380 N.Y.S. 2d 969 (1976), the plaintiff relied on a New York
statute that is very similar to Utah's Section 54-3-1,
arguing that it created an absolute statutory duty that any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

interruption of service constituted inadequate service as a
matter of law, and that the company was strictly liable for
all damages that resulted therefrom.

The court rejected

plaintiff's argument and applied the tariff limitation of
liability.

In analyzing the New York statute, the court

considered the public policy ramifications of limiting the
liability of the telephone company.

The court stated:

Section 91 does not stand in splendid isolation,
but is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for
public utilities. The requirement that 'instrumentalities
and facilities' must be 'adequate', must be read as a
statutory guide to the primary responsibility of the
commission, which is the supervision and control of
'rates, rentals and charges' for service . . . . The
rates for service, insofar as Section 91 may be
germane, must be fixed so that the telephone company's
instrumentalities and facilities shall be adequate 'to
its business'. This is a far cry from the sweeping
construction given this statute by plaintiff: That
the facilities must be adequate (meaning without any
interruption) 'to every subscriber'. The notion that
Section 91 confers a private right of action has
been rejected by courts in the past and the liability
imposed by Section 93 [virtually identical to Utah's
§ 54-7-22] has been limited to violation of a direct
order of prohibition or command by the Public Service
Commission.
Id. at 971.
The court reasoned further that "to impose the kind of
liability contended for by plaintiff" would have "a catastrophic
impact on the rates to be charged the public at large for
telephone service".

Id. at 972.

Accord Garrison v. Pacific

Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 45 Ore. App. 523, 608 P.2d
1206 (1980).
Respondent's argument tqat intentional behavior suffices
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for punitive damages is wrong.

Respondent relies on disjunctive

language in Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., No. 17013
(Utah, filed Sept. 17, 1982) ("willful or malicious"), yet
the "established jurisprudence of this state" upon which the
statement in Clayton was based indicates clearly that conduct
must be both willful and malicious in order to support
punitive damages.

E.g., First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards,

Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d
37 (Utah 1980); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution,
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354
(Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975);
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325
(1969); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380
(1963); Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962);
Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952); Calhoun
v. Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 66, 146 P.2d 284 (1944).
See also

the following cases, decided subsequent to Clayton:

Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., Case No. 17359
(Utah, filed Dec. 14, 1982); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
Isom, Case No. 17264 (Utah, filed Dec. 10, 1982).
As stated in Smoot v. Lund, supra:
[Exemplary damages] may be awarded only where
a willful and malicious injury has been perpetrated.
369 P.2d at 936 (emphasis added).
In addition, it should be noted that the term "willful"
is subject to many interpretations, including "premeditated;
malicious; done with evil intent or with a bad motive or
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purpose, or with indifference to the actual consequences;
unlawful; without legal justification."
1774 (rev. 4th Ed. 1968).

Black's Law Dictionary

In the context of th,e present

case, this court should be guided by the decisions of other
courts that have interpreted similar phrases in similar
contexts.

See discussion, supra, pp. 14-19.

Even the cases cited by Respondent hold that punitive
damages are not appropriate in such actions.

In Southwestern

Bell Telephone Co. v. Reeves, supra, cited by Respondent,
the court reversed a $50,000.00 punitive damage award.
Sommerville v. Chesapeake

In

& Potomac Telephone Co., supra,

also cited by_ Respondent, the court held that where the
telephone company acted in good faith in disconnecting
plaintiff's telephone service for non-payment, punitive
damages were not permitted even though the jury found that
the disconnection was wrongful and without justification.
In denying a claim for pun1tive damages, the court in
Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 428 S.W.2d 596
(Mo. App. 1968), observed:
[W]e have not found that in any action against
a telephone company for error or mistake, the court
has held the conduct to be willful, malicious or
reckless.
Id. at 603.
In the present case, Mountain Bell's actions in placing
the mechanical intercept were taken under a good faith
belief that it had the right to place an intercept on Respondent's
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line.

In placing the live intercept, Mountain Bell was

simply following the express order of the Public Service
Commission.

Under these circumstances, as a matter of law,

Mountain Bell should not be subject to punitive damages.

POINT V
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S
FEES.
Respondent's claim for attorney's fees may be disposed
of summarily for the following reasons:
1.

Respondent has not cross-appealed the trial court's

refusal to give jury instructions regarding attorney's fees,
and has raised the issue for the first time in its Brief.
2.

The Telalease provides for attorney's fees only to

Mountain Bell upon the lessee's (Respondent's) default, not
vice versa.

(See Ex. 6, ,[ 23.)

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, being an enactment of

3.

the 1981 legislature, was not in effect at the time this
action was filed.
4.

u.s.c.

Respondent did not plead or prove a violation of 47
§

206.

CONCLUSION
Because of the numerous errors of law and insufficient
evidence detailed in this Brief and in Appellant's first
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Brief, this Court should reverse the judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/1...ftt

day of January, 1983.

THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

By:~4~
Froya:Jensen, Attorney
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